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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, J 
Plaintiff/Appellee, J 
V • J 
THOMAS MONROE GRAY, ! 
Defendant/Appellant. i 
: Case No. 920462-CA 
s Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the sentencing determination of 
the trial court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was the trial court's sentencing determination proper? 
"Sentencing is a prerogative of the trial court and 
will not be disturbed on appeal unless the sentence 'exceeds that 
prescribed by law or unless the trial court has abused its 
discretion."' State v. Ford. 818 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah App. 
1991) (quoting State v. Shelbv. 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Thomas Moore Gray, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990) 
(R. 9). 
Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the above charge 
on January 21, 1992 (R. 16). 
The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to a 
term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, which term 
was to run consecutive to any sentence defendant was presently 
serving, and imposed a $5,000 fine (R. 20-22; Transcript of 
sentencing hearing, February 18, 1992 [T.] at 5). The trial 
court then granted defendant credit for 104 days served and 
recommended that he be considered for sexual offender and 
substance abuse programs (R. 20-21). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the time of this offense defendant was on probation 
from a conviction for forcible sexual abuse, a third degree 
felony (Br. of App. 2-3; R. 9). Defendant was arrested for 
violating the terms of his probation and booked into the Davis 
County Jail (R. 10). A search of defendant's person at the jail 
revealed the presence of controlled substances (R. 9-10). 
Defendant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of 
possession of controlled substances, a third degree felony (R. 
16). 
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Following the preparation of a pre-sentence 
investigation report, the trial court sentenced defendant to a 
term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 17, 20-
21). Based on the recommendations of Adult Probation and Parole 
(AP&P), the court ordered that defendant's term of imprisonment 
for this offense be consecutive to any sentence he was presently 
serving: 
THE COURT: Mr* Gray, I think you are right# 
you have been before this Court a number of 
times and I think the Court has complied with 
the recommendations of Adult Probation and 
Parole in allowing you sufficient time to see 
if you could resolve these problems. That 
has been unsuccessful. I feel that you have 
long standing problems that are going to take 
significant time under basically custodial 
circumstances in order for you to work these 
problems out. 
For that reason, the Court will sentence you 
to 0 to 5 years in the state prison, order 
that you serve those consecutively to any 
sentence you are serving at this time. I 
will recommend, however, that they will give 
you credit against that sentence for the 104 
days that you have been incarcerated on this 
matter up to this time. That will be my 
order. I will recommend that they consider 
you for the sexual offender program which you 
might already be in, are you not? 
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: That will be the order of the 
Court. We will remand you back to the 
custody of the Division of Corrections. 
(T. 3-5) (a complete copy of the sentencing transcript is 
contained in the Addendum). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The sentencing issue raised in defense counsel's Anders 
brief is frivolous. Based on defendant's criminal history and 
demonstrated inability to conform to the conditions of probation, 
the trial court acted within the scope of its discretion in 
requiring that defendant's term of imprisonment for this offense 
be served consecutive to any previously imposed term. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ANDERS BRIEF FAILS TO 
ARTICULATE AN ARGUMENT DEMONSTRATING THAT THE 
SENTENCING ISSUE RAISED IS IN FACT FRIVOLOUS; 
HOWEVER, BASED ON THE STATE'S REVIEW OF THE 
RECORD IT APPEARS THAT THE ISSUE IS FRIVOLOUS 
AND THUS THERE IS NO REASON WHY COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST TO WITHDRAW SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED AND 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION AFFIRMED. 
Defendant's counsel has filed an "Anders brief" and 
motion to withdraw which do not appear to be in substantial 
compliance with the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967), and Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990). 
Specifically, an Anders brief, unlike a regular brief, "must 
demonstrate that the potentially meritorious issues" raised in 
the brief are in fact frivolous. Dunn, 791 P.2d at 877. Defense 
counsel's Anders brief is deficient in this respect. For 
example, he has failed to articulate an argument demonstrating 
that the sentencing issue raised is in fact frivolous (Br. of 
App. at 4-5). To the contrary, defense counsel asserts that the 
trial court abused its discretion by imposing a consecutive 
sentence (Br. of App. 5). 
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However, although defense counsel's analysis fails to 
assure this Court that the sentencing issue raised is wholly 
frivolous, it does not appear to the State that there is any 
reason why counsel's request to withdraw should not be granted 
and the trial court's sentencing determination affirmed. 
This Court will not disturb the sentencing 
determinations of the trial court on appeal "unless the sentence 
'exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has 
abused its discretion.'" State v. Ford, 818 P.2d 1052, 1055 
(Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 
(Utah 1986)). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (1990) authorizes the 
trial court to determine "whether to impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences." In so deciding, the trial court is 
required to consider the "gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant." Section 76-3-401(2). Additionally, where a 
defendant "is sentenced at different times for one or more 
offenses, . . . or has already been sentenced by a court other 
than the present sentencing court, . . . the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years' imprisonment." 
Section 76-3-401(4)-(5). The trial court complied with section 
76-3-401 in imposing a consecutive sentence in this case. 
Rejecting the arguments of defendant and his counsel, 
the court followed the sentencing recommendations of AP&P and 
imposed a consecutive sentence (T. 5; see Addendum). In so 
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ruling, the court noted defendant's numerous appearances before 
the bench and his apparent inability to resolve "long standing 
problems" (T. 5; see Addendum)• Thus, the court determined that 
defendant required "significant time under basically custodial 
circumstances" (T. 5; see Addendum). The court then granted 
defendant credit for 104 days served and recommended that he be 
considered for sexual offender and substance abuse programs (R. 
20-21; T. 5, see Addendum). 
Imposition of a consecutive sentence under these facts 
is in compliance with the requirements of section 76-3-401. The 
trial court appropriately considered defendant's criminal history 
and his inability to conform to the conditions of previously 
granted probation. Additionally, the "aggregate maximum" of the 
consecutive zero to five year terms does not exceed 30 years. 
Thus, it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to 
require that defendant's term of imprisonment for this offense be 
consecutive to any previously imposed term. 
CONCLUSION 
The sentencing determination of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ff day of October, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
FARMINGTON, UTAH, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1992 
THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Thomas Monroe 
Gray. 
Your name is Thomas Monroe Gray? 
MR, GRAY: Yes, your Honor, it is. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gray, you are before the Court 
for the purpose of sentencing. Is there any legal reason 
known to either of you why sentence should not be imposed? 
MR. MURPHY: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is there anything either of you wish 
to say before I impose sentence? 
MR. MURPHY: I would, your Honor. I think the 
agency recommendations are in line though my client and I 
disagree with the consecutive aspect of the sentence. So 
arguing against that I would just like to state, your Honor, 
when he was sentenced originally on this offense, I believe 
he has done 18 months in prison in addition to that 90 days 
diagnostic and 30 days in jail, so he already has served a 
substantial amount of time for the offense that has been 
violated. In addition since this offense occurred, he has 
served approximately 104 days, your Honor. Therefore, Mr. 
Gray has indicated to me that he, in his opinion, he thinks 
he will max out on the remainder of his prison term that he 
is serving for his probation violation and that will be 
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approximately 21 months. So if he will do the 21 months on 
that and then be placed in a sex offender program in the 
Bonneville Community Center and then fulfill the additional 
requirements, your Honor, we think given the amount of time 
that he has already served and the time that he will likely 
serve plus the addition time that he will hopefully serve in 
the sex offender program, we think that that will be adequate 
to address the concerns and problems that had been brought 
out in the presentence report. 
THE COURT: Anything you wish to say, Mr. Gray? 
MR. GRAY: Yes, your Honor, I would. I would 
like to add to this that the charge that brought me back in 
front of the Court, possession of a controlled substance, I 
never really received any help or programming as far as 
dealing with my drug problem and alcohol problem. Since 
being out at the prison I have been attending drug and 
alcohol therapy, and I believe that with the time that the 
prison is going to give me as well as attending this 
programing out at the prison, that I will be able to get out 
and make something of my life from there on out. 
I also would like to say that I know that I have 
appeared in front of you several times and that I feel right 
now within me that I can get out and make something of my 
life if given a chance, and I don't know whether it's good to 
say or not, but I think that probation recommendation is 
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really harsh and that they are not really giving me an 
opportunity to get out and make something out of my life, and 
that's all I have to say, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gray, I think you are right, you 
have been before this Court a number of times and I think the 
Court has complied with the recommendations of Adult 
Probation and Parole in allowing you sufficient time to see 
if you could resolve these problems. That has been 
unsuccessful. I feel that you have long standing problems 
that are going to take significant time under basically 
custodial circumstances in order for you to work these 
problems out. 
For that reason, the Court will sentence you to 
0 to 5 years in the state prison, order that you serve those 
consecutively to any sentence you are serving at this time. 
1 will recommend, however, that they will give you credit 
against that sentence for the 104 days that you have been 
incarcerated on this matter up to this time. That will be my 
order. I will recommend that they consider you for the 
sexual offender program which you might already be in, are 
you not? 
MR. GRAY: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: That will be the order of the Court. 
We will remand you back to the custody of the Division of 
Corrections. 
(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
